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310 DAWSON v. GOFF [43 C.2d 
to the conversation. There is in plaintiff's 
testimony to impugn his He did all any lawyer of 
the professional standards could have done under 
the conditions. Defendant waived plaintiff's disqualification 
under the dead man's (Deacon v. Bryans, 212 
Cal. 87, 90-93 [298 P. Defendant will be unable to 
make any showing to the of the of plain-
tiff. Under these the should be re-
versed with directions as I have indicated. (Conner v. 
Grosso, 41 Cal.2d 229, 232 P.2d 435] " 
Dooling, J. pro concurred. 
[L. A. No. 23175. In Bank. July 30, 1954.] 
DOROTHY C. DAWSON, as Special Administratrix, etc., 
et al., Appellants, v. CHARLES R. GOFF et al., Re-
spondents. 
[la, lb] Venue-Actions Ex Contractu.-Code Civ. Proc., § 395, 
subd. 1, relating to venue in contract actions, requires that 
all actions arising on contract shall be tried in county in which 
defendant resides or in which contract was made, unless de-
fendant has contracted specially and in writing as to county 
in which his obligation is to be performed, in which event such 
county is also a proper county for trial of action. 
[2] !d.-Actions Ex Contractu.-As regards question of venue, 
obligation of contract is incurred at time contract is made, 
and obligations under it arise and are incurred in county in 
which it is made. 
[3] !d.-Actions Ex Contractu.-Under Code Civ. Proc., § 395, 
subd. 1, relating to venue in contract actions, county where 
contract is made is deemed to be county where it is to be 
performed unless there is a special written contract to the 
contrary. 
[4] Corporations-Transfers of Stock-Sales-Questions of Law. 
-Whether letter written by defendants to plaintiff in which 
they "agree" to purchase certain corporate stock from plain-
tiff on demand and on which plaintiff's signature appears after 
notation "Accepted," or whether plaintiff's subsequent written 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Venue,§ 17 et seq.; Am.Jur., Venue,§ 19 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-3, 12, 14] Venue, § 26; [4] Corpora-
tions, § 306; [5] Corporations, § 305; [6-11, 13] Contracts, § 17. 
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
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demand that defendants such stock pursuant to the 
writing, constitutes contract of sale is a question of 
law in absence of extrinsic evidence on question. 
!d.-Transfers of Stock--Sales-Options.-If letter written 
defendants to plaintiff in which they "agree" to purchase 
certain corporate stock at stated from plaintiff and on 
which plaintiff's appears after notation "Accepted" 
does not constitute a contract for sale of stock because 
it is lacking in mutual consent and consideration in that plain-
tiff does not promise to sell any stock to defendants, it can 
constitute an offer by defendants to buy such number of shares, 
not exceeding stated amount, as plaintiff desires to sell, in 
which case plaintiff would have option to sell amount of stock 
at stated price to defendants and they could not revoke offer 
or option given to plaintiff during time specified because it is 
supported by special consideration, such consideration being 
presumed because of the writing. 
[6] Contracts- Options.- In an option contract the optionor 
stipulates that for specified or reasonable period he waives 
right to revoke offer. 
Id.-Options.-Civ. Code, §§ 1582, 1583, relating to mode of 
communicating acceptance of proposal and when such com-
munication is deemed complete, are applicable to acceptance or 
exercise of option by optionee under option contract as well 
as to a revocable offer. 
[8] Id.-Options.-An option contract is different from contract 
to which irrevocable offer of optionor relates, since optionee 
by parting with special consideration for binding promise of 
optionor refrains from binding himself with regard to con-
tract to which the option relates. 
!d.-Options.-While optionee incurs no liability with regard 
to contract as to which he holds option, optionor has irrrev-
ocably promised on exercise of option to perform contract on 
terms specified in his binding offer, and creation of final con-
tract requires no promise or other action by optionor because 
contract is completed by aceeptance of offer by optionee. 
[10] Id.-Options.-An option contract gives optionee a right 
against optionor for performance of contract to which option 
relates on exercise of option, which optionor cannot defeat 
by repudiating option. 
[11] Id.-Options.-Since optionor promises to perform contract 
to which option relates, subject to a condition at discretion of 
optionee, option contract involves on part of optionor a uni-
lateral promise to perform obligations of contract to which 
option relates. 
[6] See Cal.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 15; Am.Jur., Contracts, § 27. 
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[12] Venue-Actions Ex Contractu.-Rule that agreement 
of to perform obligation of 
relates should be applied in interpret-
to venue in contract actions, 
to have action tried in 
residence unless he contracted to perform 
his under contract in another county. 
Contracts-Options.-In contract, though option 
optionee, defendant optionor 
as far as he is con-
[14] court could rea-
for purpose of determining venue, that 
defendants to plaintiff in which they "agree" 
uLu.cuu~e certain stock from plaintiff was a bind-
contract inasmuch as it does not show on its face 
that there was no consideration and rebuttable pre-
of consideration applies, defendants would have in-
ua;c;u·"'"'H on date such instrument was executed, and 
been executed in county in which defendants reside 
failed to bring himself within any excep-
tions in Code Civ. Proc., § 395, relating to venue in contract 
actions, such county is proper county in which to have action 
tried for breach of contract to purchase stock . 
.APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County granting motion for change of venue. Ells-
worth Meyer, Judge. Affirmed. 
Jackson & 
vV arner for Appellants. 
Ridgway Sutton and Caryl 
Mcinnis & Hamilton, Mcinnis, Hamilton & Fitzgerald and 
,John vV. Mcinnis for Respondents. 
CARTER, J.-Plaintiffs, the administratrix of the estate 
of C. L. Dawson, Jr., deceased, and two other Dawsons, com-
menced, in Los .A.ngeles County, an action against defendants 
Goff and Garland, alleging in their complaint that on February 
26, 1953, a written contract of sale was made in Los Angeles 
County in which plaintiffs agreed to sell and defendants to 
buy 28,800 shares of stock in Grand Stores Company, at $2.53 
per share, to be paid within three years with interest at 5 per 
cent. Plaintiffs' tendered delivery of the stock on February 
26th, 1953, was refused by defendants on March 10, 1953, 
whereupon plaintiffs notified defendants that they would 
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instrument was 




to from you, your 
upon demand vvritten or verbal at any time 
not exceed thousand ( 40,000) 
Stores Co for a of $2.53 per 
The terms of the for this stock to be de-
termined at the time demand is made but in 
any case full is to be made 
that and interest on deferred 
Yours very 
CHARLES R. GoFF 
R. HASTINGS GARLAND 
2/28/50 
terminates if no demand is made on Feb-
CHARLES R. GoFF 
c. L. DAWSON, JR." 
stated for deceased in the in-
Apparently the number of 
the to 30,300 on 
County, plaintiffs 
wrote and mailed defendants in San County a writ-
entitled Demand to Purchase Stock Pursuant to Option 
that defendants purchase 28,800 shares 
of stock pursuant to the instrument dated February 28th, 
contract men-
395 of the Code of Civil Procedure;* that 
San the proper 
the basis of the action~the instrument 
1950~was made there. Plaintiffs assert 
that the document dated 28th, was merely an 
offer and that the contract was not made until they accepted 
the offer by their demand that plaintiffs take the which 
they say was made in Los Angeles when the demand 
was in United States mail there, and hence the 
contract was made in Los Angeles County and it was a 
proper county for the trial of the action. 
Section 395, supra, has been interpreted to mean that the 
opening clause, "\vhen defendant has contracted to perform 
an obligation in a ' has no particular sig-
nificance as a limitation on the rest of the sentence. [1a] The 
section in effect says that " ... all actions on contract 
shall be tried in the in which the defendant or 
in which the contract was unless the defendant has 
contracted specially and in as to the in which 
his obligation is to be in which event such county 
is also a proper for the trial of action." (Armstrong 
exccr't in thi~ section otherwi8e provided, 
the court to tnuu;ft>r ndions or 
aq in this title, the cmmty in whieh the or some 
of rcsiile nt the commenremcnt of the m:tion, is the proper county 
for the trial of the action .... .,\Vhen a defendant has contracted to 
ped'onn an either the where 
such the contrnct in >vas 
entered or any such defendant, 
resides at commencement of the action, shall a proper county for 
the trial of nn aetion founded on such olJligatlon, and the county in 
which such is incurred slwll be deemed to be the county 
in which it is specin 1 contract ht 
'niting to the contrary. ' 
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basis of action, was made in Los -="'"c"c" 
not say it is to be 
Plaintiffs in their complaint, as a basis for their 
that a contract was entered into in Los Angeles County 
·when ' " what is claimed was defendants' offer, 
their affidavits are to the same effect. No answer denying 
such allegation has been filed but the affidavits of defendants 
show the transactions and involved and that the 
so-called was the relied on by plaintiffs 
in their as the eontract made in Los Angeles 
There is no dispute that the transaetions were such 
as are heretofore set forth. It is not important, therefore, 
that there is no express denial of the [4] Which 
paper is the contract is a of law in the absence of ex-
trinsic evidence on the question, assummg it would be ad-
missible. 
[5] Assuming the 1950, did not 
constitute a contract for the sale of the stock because 
was lacking in mutual consent and consideration in that 
plaintiffs did not promise to sell any stock or any number of 
shares to it could constitute an offer by the 
(defendants) to buy such number of shares, not exceed-
the stated amount, as the sellers (plaintiffs) desired to sell. 
stated in another way, since plaintiffs had an option to 







(the contract for 
when mailed 
stock, which was in 
the purpose of the venue oc<<~>uccco. 
tract which was entered into 
[7] As to the first 
conditions the communication 
the proposer is not bound unless are conformed to ; but 
in other cases any reasonable and usual mode may be '"'''n"r"'n 
( Oiv. Code, § ''Consent is deemed to be 
municated between the 
a proposal has his course of trans-
mission to the proposer, in to the last section.'' 
(Oiv. Code, § 1583.) Those sections have been held appli-
cable to acceptance or exercise of an an optionee 
under an option contract as well as to a revokable offer. (See 
Canty v. Brown, 11 487 P. , Shubert 
Theatrical Co. v. 271 F. 827; contra Corbin on Con-
tracts, § 264.) 
[8] In regard to the second this court in Warner 
Bros. Pictures v. Brodel, 31 Cal.2d 766 [192 P.2d 949, 
3 A.L.R.2d 691], was concerned with a of whether 
a contract to perform services was within the 
terms of a statute dealing with 
by the court, an option contract had been to the pro-
posed recipient of the services. We held that the contract 
to perform the services was made when the contract 
was made although recognizing the rule that where 
there is an option contract, there are two the option 
contract and the contract to which it relates. We said (p. 
772) : "Such a contract is different from the con-
tract to which the irrevocable offer of the optionor relates, 
*''A written instrument is nrPR1m1nr1 8\'idence of consideration." 
(Civ. Code, § 1614; see Code Proc., § 1963, subd. 39.) 
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(The contract 
an contract involves on the 
unilateral. to perform the 
contract to which the option relates. . . . 
follows that even the differs from 
the 
or render services.' " 
v. El Royale Corp., 54 
[12] We can see no reason 
m section 
supra, because it gives 
action tried in the county 
contracted to perform his 
under the contract in another county. The ex-
is concerned with where incurred the 
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'J'he order is afiirmed. 
Shenk Aeting 0. J., Edmonds, J .. 
and Dooling, J. pro tem.,'-'' concurred. 
SOHAUKn, J.-1 concur in the 
the opinion but for of 
to point ont that the 
here 
[43 0.2d 
It is what his rela-
Spence, J., 
and generally in 
deem it proper 
with which we are 
a concomitant 
from an option to 
to No one, 
to sell conversely, 
tender by the 
the stock described 
for breach. 
